Duress and Fraud
The formal contracts of the Jus Civile derived their legal force from the exact performance of their respective forms. Of course the parties must have consented to observe these formalities, but it was the form, not the consent, that gave binding force to the contract.
Hence formal contracts were binding by the Jus Civile if made in proper form, even though procured by force or fraud. But in later times the praetor allowed either duress or fraud to be set up as a defense to an action on the contract. The informal contracts, being Bona fide contracts were not binding if made through fear or induced by fraud.
Duress. The duress might take the form of violence (vis) or of intimidation (metus). Violence was the actual exercise of superior force; intimidation was the employment of threats of evil sufficient to overcome the resolution of a person of ordinary firmness. It was immaterial whether the duress was exercised by the other party to the contract or by a third person. In either case it constituted a good defense. Thus a promise extorted by a threat of death or bodily torment, or by confinement of the person, was voidable.
But duress did not invalidate a contract unless the duress was unlawful. Thus where a praetor, in the exercise of his lawful authority, required a defendant to promise to save his neighbor harmless if his house should fall to the injury of, the neighbor, by threat to give the house into the custody of the complainant, the promise was valid. But a promise of money extorted by a magistrate from an innocent person by a threat to condemn him to death, was not binding, this being an illegal exercise of power (Hunter, 593; Sohm, 209).
Fraud (Dolus). Unlike duress, the defense of fraud was available only when the fraud was perpetrated by a party to the contract. The fraud of a third person did not vitiate the contract, but the party defrauded had a right of action for the fraud (actio de dolo) against the perpetrator.
As in the case of English law, fraud in Roman law was a very comprehensive term, and seems to have been nowhfre precisely and accurately defined. It might consist either in the making of a false representation (suggestio falsi), or in the concealment of the truth (suppressio veri) (Hunter, 596-597; Sohm, 209).